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ABSTRACT
A model combining student preferences for college with university
admissions decisions is estimated to provide information on the role of test
scores in the determination of post-secondary educational opportunities. In
contrast to implications of much of the recent criticism of tests and their
use, we find that scholastic aptitude test scores are more strongly related
to student application and choice of college "quality" than to college admis-
sions decisions.In addition, although there is a substantial correlation
between test scores and high school performance, we find that both post-
secondary school preferences and ultimate opportunities are related as much
to performance in high school as to test scores themselves. Although SAT
scores certainly exclude some persons from schools, our findings indicate
that they do not represent a dominating constraint on the college opportu-
nities of high school graduates.
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The role of test scores in the determination of post-secondary
school opportunities has been the focus of considerable public dis-
cussion and of recent court decisions. These expressions of public
interest and conventional wisdom more generally, however, are often
based on limited evidence and may not be informed by the most relevant
or appropriate information. Our goal is to provide in this paper quan-
titative information on the current effect of Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) scores and other individual attributes on the college preferences
of high school graduates and the admissions decisions of post-secondary
schools. We hope that the evidence will enlarge the background for and
will help to inform future discussion and decisions on the subject.
A great deal of criticism has centered around the validity of
college entrance examinations as predictors of college success, while
othercriticism has questioned the cultural fairness of the tests.
Both lines of criticism are reflected in calls for truth in testing
* Research Fellow, J.F.K. Schoolof Government, Harvard University;
Stambaugh Professor of Political Economy, J.F.K. School of Government,
Harvard University and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic
Research respectively.-2-
legislation in several states and in movements to deemphasize the role
of tests in college admissions.1 An apparent concern is that test
scores may have an extreme influence on post-secondary educational
opportunities and thus presumably on subsequent occupational oppor-
tunities. This concern may be heightened by the limited evidence on
the relationship between test scores and performance in college and
the even more limited evidence on the relationship between test scores
and academic training on the one hand and occupational productivity or
performance on the other. The extent to which answers to the latter
questions are important depends in part simply on the magnitudeof the
effect of SAT scores on student and college decisions. The recent em-
phasis on test scores may have tended to exaggerate their influence on
schooling opportunities relative to the influence of other determinants,
in particular school performance itself, and may have misdirected atten-
tion to school decisions and away from student choices.
While the importance of test scores has been a major focus of
public concern, the influence on college choice of increased earnings
attributable to college education has been the focus of much of economic
research on the subject.2 Exceptions are formal discrete choice models
of college selection.3 Whatever the focus of the economic research, it
1. Substantial discussion has been sparked by the recent Nader re-
port on the Educational Testing Service (Nairn and Associates[1980]),
Slack and Porter [1980], and the response to the former (ETS [1980]).
2. Recent examples are Willis and Rosen [1979] and Dresch and
Waldenberg [1978].
3. Radner and Miller [1975], Kohn, Manski, and Mundel [1976],
Manski and Wise [1978], and Fuller, Mariski, and Wise [1980].-3-
has emphasized college attendance versus non-attendance without consider-
ing the several separate decisions that determine attendance. There are
at least three: the student's decision of whether to apply and if so,
to which schools, and the colleges' admission decisions. Our goal is
to present empirical evidence on the relative influence of test scores
andother individual characteristics on each of these post—secondary
school preferences and opportunities.
Humancapital literature for the most part emphasizes individual
optimal education decisions, investment in education until the marginal
benefits--in large part in terms of increased future earnings--are just
offset by the marginal cost of another unit of education. In this con-
text, test scores may be thought of as providing individuals and schools
with information that will help them to make choices that are closer to
the optimum than would be possible without this information. Individuals
are presumably aided in determining how much they can get out of addi-
tional education--what the gains from additional education will be--and
which schools will provide for them the most advantageous education.
Test scores presumably help colleges to select the students who will
benefit most from the education they provide.1
The approach of this paper, however, is to ask to what extent test
scores constrain individual choice and thereby limit educational oppor-
tunities. Do test scores limit human capital investment decisions and
if so, how substantial is the constraint? How important are test scores
1.In a different context, Rothschild [1979] discusses ways in
which employment tests may increase national output by permitting more
efficient allocation of resources.-4-
in screening students among colleges of various qualities and does the
screening operate by way of college application decisions made by indi-
viduals or through college admission decisions?
The findings of this paper provide only part of the evidence that
would be useful in judging the role of test scores in the determination
of individual choice and opportunity. A closely related question isthe
extent to which test scores help to determine the likelihood that a given
student will succeed in a particular college, the likelihood of graduation
for example. Another relevant question is ihe extent to which college
quality, given initial student attributes, affects later opportunitiesas
measured, for example, by earnings.If tests constrain college oppor-
tunities, then the importance to the individual of the constraint may
depend in part on its effect on his opportunities after graduation.Both
of these topics are subjects of related papers and will be discussed
briefly in the concluding section of this paper. The subjectof this
paper seems to be a logical precursor toeither of these.
We began our research with a focus on the determinants of college
admissions, but we realized quickly that to obtain a comprehensive pic-
ture of the importance of students' prior school performanceand test
scores, it was necessary to consider the student applicationand quality
of school choices in conjunction with college admissions decisions.
Thus we have developed a model that yields joint estimates of thedeter-
minants of all three decisions. In a technical sense, the modelincor-
porates two discrete choices with a continuous outcome.The continuous
outcome is the aver SAT score of students at the school towhich a-5-
student applies; it is our measure of school "quality."1 In addition to
individual SAT scores, we have emphasized the influence of high school
class rank, non—academic achievement in high school, family background,
and local labor market conditions on student decisions to apply for
college admission. A primary goal of our analysis has been to compare
therelative importance of these characteristics in determining indi-
vidual and college decisions.
We have based our estimates on data obtained from the National
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972. During the spring
of 1972, approximately 23,000 high school seniors were surveyed. The
data collected included information on each student's family back-
ground, high school performance, and a host of other student character-
istics. The students also took a battery of six aptitude tests as-
sembleci by the Educational Testing Service (ETS). Three Follow-Up
surveys were used to obtain information on post-secondary school and
work decisions as well as other related data. We have based our esti-
mates on a random sample of approximately 5,000 of the total sample and
have used data from the initial survey and the first follow-up survey.
We find that the importance of both measured academic aptitude and
past school performance is reflected much more in student than in college
decisions. Test scores in themselves do not in general, through college
admissions policies, narrowly pigeonhole persons to a very limited set of
post-secondary school opportunities. Test scores and high school class
1.We. are well aware that a comprehensive measure of college quality
is almost impossible to define because there are so many determinants of
it and because it is a subjective attribute that depends on individual judg-
ment and preferences. Nonetheless, we will sometimes use it as shorthand
for the measure that we have.-6-
rank are roughly of equal importance in the determination of both student
application and college admission decisions. Our results pertain to
schools on average; individual colleges and universities of course may
have different admissions policies.
The higher the local wage rate, the less likely are high school
graduates to go to college, although the effect is small. The local
unemployment rate is not significantly related to college application.
Thus apparently our findings weakly support the presumption that there
is some interaction between local labor market opportunities and the
continuation of schooling; poorer labor market prospects induce more
persons to attend school.
Black youth are much more likely than white youth to apply to a
college, given high school class rank, test scores, and family background.
If affirmative action measures have influenced college attendance, our
results indicate that their effects may have been on student application
decisions more than on college admission decisions.
The model we have used is described in Section I.The data are
explained in Section II. The results are presented in Section III. Con-
cluding remarks are contained in Section IV.
I.The Model
We want to describe how individual attributes are related tothe
likelihood of college admissions. Presumably college admission de-
cisions depend on the college's academic standards and on theindi-
vidual attributes of the applicant being considered. Of course any
given colTege considers only students who apply toit. Our approach
is intended to integrate the student application decision withthe-7—
college admission decision, with the particular goal of obtainingcon-
sistent estimates of admission probability parameters. We willmotivate
our statistical model by first considering a simple and standard random
choice interpretation of it. The statistical model will then beset
forth in a succinct form.
Standard economic reasoning prescribes that whether a given indi-
vidual finds it worthwhile to go to college depends on theopportunities
available to him if he were not to have a college education,as well as
the costs of a college education and the opportunities that would be
available with a college degree. The opportunitiesmay be defined by
monetary reward as well as other occupational and social characteristics.
The costs of a college education may include the effortor discomfort
associated (by some) with college attendance, as well asforegone earn-
ings. The opportunities available to an individual without college,
the relationship between college and subsequentopportunities, and the
cost of college incurred by the tndiyidual are all likely to depend on
individual attributes. For example, persons with high academic aptitude
may gain more from college than persons with lower aptitude. The cost
of college to an individual-—relative to the gains-—is likely also to
depend on the wealth of his parents.' The socioeconomic background of
an individual may in general influence his schooling decisions. Oppor-
tunities without a college degree will be determined in part by the
local labor market conditions faced by the individual.
1. At least if capital markets are imperfect, and if socioeconomic
background influences tastes, even if they are not.-8-
Finally, there is a wide variety of schools, and the particular
school that an individual prefers is presumed to depend on his character-
istics. It is also reasonable to suppose that whether an individual
chooses to go to college should depend on the quality of school he would
attend, were he to go to college.
One formal way to capture this line of reasoning is the following.
Suppose that X represents a vector of personal, family, and local labor
market variables. Suppose that associated with an individual 'Soppor-
tunities without a college degree is a value U0 that depends on X as




where b0 is a vector of parameters. Suppose also that if a person were
to go to college the quality of the most preferred college would be
(2) Q =X
+
where is a vector of parameters and £2 a randomterm.' Finally,
suppose that opportunities with a college education (callthem U1)
dependon the characteristics X directly, as well as on the quality
Qofthe college attended, so that
(3) U1 = Xb + Qc1 + e1
1.Theeffect of XonQmayreflect in part the individual's
perceptionof the probability of admission to a school of quality Q.
We will return to this point later.
2. Higher quality schools, for example, may increase future earn-
ings (Solmon [1975], Solmon and Wachtel [1975], Morgan and Duncan [1979]);
it mayalsoaffect the enjoyment of a person while a student, or the time
and effort required to obtain a degree.-9-
For expository purposes, we have shown U1 as linear in Q, although our
statistical specification does not impose this constraint, and indeed
other work has shown the relationship to benon-linear.1If we substi-







Suppose further that an individual would apply to college onlyif the
value associated with an education at the most preferredschool is
greater than the value associated with opportunitieswithout a college
degree. Then the probability of applyingto college is given by the








where A, l' and Cl are defined by the equality,with A representing
the value to the individual of opportunitieswith college, minus the
valueof opportunities without college.2 Noticethat l is a vector
of "reduced form" parameters, each indicating,according to this inter-
pretation, the effect of the associatedvariable on the difference be-
tween the value of opportunities withand without college.
1.See Fuller, Manski, and Wise [1980].
2.This specification does not explicitly account for the cost of
application, which we believe is not a major determinant of application
for most students, but may be important for some who are at the marain.
Many schools will waive the application fee on request. In any case,
the effect of the cost of application is captured in the constant term
inour empirical specification.-10-
Equations (2) and (5) together represent demand for college educa-
tion. This aspect of the model is analogous to the profit maximization
discrete-continuous production models proposed by Duncan [1980] and a
similar net supply system model discussed by McFadden [1979],
Thus far we have discussed only the choice of individuals and have
presumed that a person would apply to a college only if attendance at
that school would be more advantageous to the individual than oppor-
tunities without college. A much more detailed model of individual
choice among schools to which a person has been admitted is presented
by Fuller, tlanski, and Wise [1980].Another and also more elaborate
approach is followed by Abowd L19//J. w wou riis paper, flow—
ever, to consider jointly the individual's application decision and
college quality decision together with admission decisions made by
colleges.
From application material submitted by students, we presume that
admissions officers are able to predict academic potential. Suppose
that in general the available information includes test scores—-which
may afford a straightforward means of comparing all applicants--aswell
as other indicators of academic preparation such as high school grades or
high school class rank. Other information, such as recommendations,
may also provide evidence of academic potential, althoughit may entail
consider&ble subjective assessment on the part of admissions officers.
Suppose for ease of exposition that given the high school class rank
ofperson i and a test score the academic potential of personi




is a disturbance term that captures the stochastic nature of
subjective assessment.It may reflect attributes known to admissions
officers but for which we do not have measures, and it may vary with
the school to which the individual applies. The parameters c1 and
are weights placed by admissions officers on test scores and past school
performance. For convenience we shall assume for the time being that
they are constant across colleqes.
The equation above is very similar to the relationship underlying
the extensive literature on the predictive validity of tests. In this
literature, would be replaced by a measure of academic performance
in college--such as grades—-and test scores and high school class rank
would be taken as predictors of college performance.1
It may be tempting to specify the admissions decision as a function
of test scores and class rank and to compare the estimated coefficients
on the variables in such an admissions model with the estimated validity
coefficients on these measures. But, the academic potential of appli-
cants is not the sole criterion for admission to most colleges. Other
student characteristics including non-academic talents may also be
valued by schools. Consequently, a more realistic description of the
1. For the case of a single predictor the validity coefficient is
the regression (correlation) coefficient in a normalized model. The
validity coefficient with a set of predictor variables is the multiple
correlation between and the predictors. A recent survey of over
800 such studies found validity coefficients of 0.52 for high school
grades, 0.41 for the SAT, and 0.58 for both predictors combined. See
Ford and Campos [1977].—12—
relationship between admissions decisions and student att'ibutes should
;clude a broader range of student characteristics than the indicators
of academic ability contained in validity models. The relationship (6)
is presumed to indicate only the evaluation by college j of the academic
potential of student i.
In addition, while colleges may broadly agree on the academic poten-
tialof an applicant with given characteristics, we know that colleges
have different admissions criteria. In order to translate the above rela-
tionship into a selection rule we recognize that an individual's likeli-
hood of admission to a particular college will depend in part on the
qualificationsof others who apply to that college.
Thus we suppose that for admission purposes, collegej attachesa
"generalized"potential to student i--call itV__that depends on
academicpotential P1, as well as other individual attributes Z, so
that
(7)
= + Z6 = aiT + ct2R + +e.
where
Z.is a vector of attributes and 6 a vector of parameters. We
alsorecognize that higher quality schools ceteris paribus require
higher academic quality for admission than lower qualityschools.1
i.of course'quality' itself is indirectly determined by the
number of applicants as well as their qualifications. In a strict sense
the application decision for each student is not independent of the
decisions rendered on other applicants. However since selection ratios
and measured characteristics of enrollees tend to change slowly over
time, we have defined college quality without reference to the current
applicant pool.In the empirical work that follows we use the average
SAT scores of students attending the college in 1972 as a measure of
quality. We discuss this in more detail in the next section.-13-
Suppose that the required level of in college j is a function of
Q and is given by L aQ +u,where u. is a random term) Further,
suppose that colleges are willing to trade off academicpotential P
against other attributes Z, so that the probability ofadmission of


















where S, X, and E3aredefined by the last equality and the index
j has been suppressed.
All of these relationships can be presented succinctly in a model
with the following three components:
Application: A =X1.B1
+





The likelihood that individual i applies to some college is assumed to
be represented by an unobserved indicator variableA, that depends on
1. This multiplicative specification is a simplification. All
that is needed to generate the following results is that Lj be a
monotonic increasing function of Q.. Our empirical specification per-
mits a nonlinear effect.-14-
the personal characteristic X11 and the random term £.Thequality
of the school that a person applies to is given by the continuous
variable also assumed to depend on personal characteristics X2. and
a random term cj. It should be interpreted asthe quality of college
a person with measured attributes X would select as afirst choice, were
he to apply to college. The likelihood that a personwith characteristics
X3. will be admitted to aschool of quality Q1 is indicated by the
unobserved indicator variable S1, that depends on the random term
as well as on X31 and The characteristics that enter each
equation are distinguished by the number in the subscriptsbecause not
all of the elements of X enter each of the equations. Itis helpful
for interpretation to keep in mind that the random terms captureun-
measured determinants of the relationships. A is assumed to be posi-
tively related to college application and to have the property that a
person applies to some college if A is large enough--in particular,
following the usual normalizing assumption, if A >0.S is assumed to
have the property that a person is admitted if S >0.
We will use this same general idea, but we must describe the
probabilities of three possible outcomes. To do this, we need to con-






The variance of the qualities of schools applied to by persons with
given characteristics X, is2. The correlation between unobserved
determinants of college application and the quality of school applied
to is given by p12; the correlation between unobserved determinants
of application and unobserved determinants of admissions is given by
p13; and thecorrelation between the unobserved determinants of college
quality and of admissions is given by p23. For identification, the
disturbances in both of the dichotomous relationships are taken to
have variance 1.
we expect a priori that the unobserved determinants ot the
applications and college quality decisions, both made by applicants, are
likely to be highly correlated; but that the correlations between these
two and the admission decisions may be much less. This approach is used
of course to correct for "selection bias." If the unmeasured attributes
that determine admissions decisions are correlated with the unmeasured
attributes that determine the quality of the school that an individual
applies to, we cannot obtain consistent estimates of the effects on
admissions decisions of measured variables without "correcting for"
the correlation between these unmeasured variables. And of course only
persons who apply to some school select a school of a given quality. To
obtain consistent estimates of the effects of personal characteristics on
the quality of school persons apply to, we must also account for the
possible correlation between unmeasured determinants of the quality of
school and unmeasured determinants of application.
For any individual i, there are three possible outcomes: individual
i does not apply to college so that A1<O and no college quality is-16-
observed; individual i applies to a college of quality Q.and is admitted
so thatA1>O, quality Q.is observed, and S>O; individual i applies to a
college of quality Q1 but is not admitted sothat A>O quality is
observed, and S<O.
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whereis a standard normal distribution function and g is a condition-
al bivariate normal density function.





+ 1 nP2. + 1
wherethethree summations distinguish thegroups corresponding to the
three possible outcomes. The likelihood function is maximizedwith
respect to the parameters to be estimated:l' 2' p12, p13
and p23.
II. The Data From the National Longitudinal Study of theHigh School
Class of 1972
We have confined our attention to four-year colleges and univer-
sities. For example, the probability of application refers to the
probability of application to a four year college; some of those who
didn't apply to four year schools applied to twoyear or vocational
schools. In addition, the National Longitudinal Study of theHigh School
Class of 1972 asked the respondents to list in order ofpreference the
first three schools to which they had applied. We have basedour esti-
mates on the first of those and have checked the results using the second
school listed by those who applied to more than one school.1
1. Approximately 63 percent applied to only one school; 21percent
applied to two schools; and only 16 percent to three or more schools.
The "most preferred" school is the best apparent indicator ofstudent
preferences and admissions decisions based on these applications have
been checked with admissions decisions based on applicationsto the
second most preferred school. The results are not noticeably different.-18-
Our analysis is based on several groups of variables. The first
group includes variables that describe the individual's academic apti-
tude and high school performance, as well as non-academic achievements
in high school.
The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score of an individual is
thought to have a substantial effect on his post—secondary school
preferences and on available alternatives. Although SAT scores are
recorded for many students in our sample, not all of them took the
SAT test. Many took no college admission test at all, while others
took the American College Testing Program (ACT) test. Our method of
analysis requires that we have an academic ability measure for all
persons in the sample, not only for those who took the SAT test--
undoubtedly for most because they planned to apply to some school.
For this reason, in some components of the analysis we have used the
SAT "equivalent" of the ACT score or an SAT score predicted on the basis
of the ETS test scores that are available for each person in our sample.
High school class rank is also presumed to influence both student
application and college admission decisions. Any individual's class
rank is determined not only by his ability, but by the ability of
others in his high school as well. We do not have a definitive measure
of high school quality, but have tried to control for it in part by
including in our analysis the percent of students from an individual's
high school who "go" to two-year and four-year colleges. Finally, we have
used two measures of non-academic achievement in high school: leadership
in student government and athletic achievement.-19-
The first group of individual characteristics is presumed to
affect both the student's application decision and the admission
decision of colleges. We believe that measures close to these would
be available to most college admissions officers; we believe the only
exception is the proportion of students from an applicant's high
school who go to college, although in many instances admissions officers
may have other implicit or explicit indicators of the quality of high
school that an applicant attended. For example, admissions officers
may have information on the past performance of students from a par-
ticular high school. Admission decisions are also presumed to depend
on "quality" of the college in question. Our measure of quality is the
average of the SAT scores of students entering the school.'
The second group of variables is intended to measure an individual 'S
socioeconomicbackground and enters the application and college quality
equations. It includes family income and parents' education.
Race is also included, with the effect of race allowed to interact
with geographic region--South versus Non-South.
The third group includes two measures of local labor market con-
ditions: a local wage rate and a local unemployment rate. These
variablesenter the application equation.
Finally, the analysis includes an indicator of sex, and an indi-
catorof urban versus rural high school attendance.
The variables are defined as follows:
1.Solmon [1975] discusses several alternative measures of college
quality and expresses a preference for SAT scores over survey measures
such as the Gourman ratings. See also Astin and Henson [1977].-20-
SAT: the sum of the verbal and mathematics scores on the Scholastic
Aptitude Test if this test was taken, the SAT 'equivalent" of the score
on the ACT test if it was taken, or, if neither of these was available, a
predicted SAT score based on 5 of the 6 ETS tests administered to the
National Longitudinal Study sample.
College SAT: the average of the SAT scores of the students in the
college to which an individual has applied.
High School Class Rank: the percentile rank of a person in the
person's high school, based on course grades.
High School Student Government Leader: one if the person was a
leader in high school student government and zero otherwise.
High School Athlete: one if the student was a "leader" in high
school athletics and zero otherwise.
Percent of High School Class Going to Colleqe: the percent of
students from an individual's high school who go to two or four year
colleges.
Parents' Income: family income as reported by the youth respondent.
Education of Mother (Father) less than High School: one if the
individual's mother (father) had less than a high school education and
zero otherwise.
Education of Mother (Father) College Degree or More: One if the
individual's mother (father) had a college degree or more education, and
zero otherwise. The excluded category is a high school degree but less
than a college degree.
Black in the South: one if the person was black and: (1) went to
high school in the South (college application and college quality equation)-21-
or (2) applied to a college in the South (admissions equation).'
Black in the Non-South: defined analoaously to Black in the South.
White in the South: defined analogously to Black in the South.
The excluded category is White in the Non-South.
Local Wage Rate: average 1972 wage of manufacturing workers in the
SMSA of the individual's high school, or if not available, the state
average.
Local Unemployment Rate: SMSA 1972 unemployment rate (or state rate
where not available).
Male: one if the individual is male and zero if female.
Urban: one if the individual went to hicih school in an urban area
and zero otherwise.
Parents' Income Missing: one if the youth did not report parents'
income and zero otherwise.
The means and standard deviations of the variables are shown in
Appendix Table 1.
III. The Results
The estimated parameters for each of the three equations, together
with (asymptotic) standard errors, are shown in Table 1. The results
can be most easily understood by considering the effects of specified
changes in the riqht hand variables. Such effects are presented in
Table 2. We will discuss first some of the implications of the results
in Table 1 and then turn to Table 2. Finally, we will present simula-
1.South is assumed to include the following states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, West Virginia.-22-
tionsbased on our estimates.
A. Parameter Estimates
The variable "SAT score" is used in the application and college quality
equations, as well as in the admissions equation. Although we do not have
an unambiguous interpretation of the estimated effect of this measure on
application and college quality, we are inclined to interpret the relevant
coefficients as measuring the effects of scholastic aptitude or academic
preparation. The ambiguity arises because some students apparently decide
not to go to college (and thus do not take the SAT) without knowing precise-
ly what their scholastic aptitude is, according to either the ETS battery
of tests or according to an SAT score. In addition, some students make
decisions on which schools to apply to before they know their SAT scores.
On the other hand, it is clear that actual SAT scores influence the ulti-
mate application decision of many students. In short, we do not know
precisely what information is available to students when they apply to a
given college. Nonetheless, we feel that our loose interpretation is not
likely to be far off, because most students receive many other indications
of scholastic aptitude or preparation prior to the time that the SAT is
taken, indications that are likely to be highly correlated with SATscores.1
The "college SAT" is entered in the admissions eauation in a Diece-
wise linear fashion. The breakpoints are at the mean of college SAT and
at the mean plus one standard deviation. It can be seen in Table 1 that,
given other individual attributes, the probability of admission declines
1. For example, PSAT scores that are usually obtained during the
junior year in high school.-23-
with college SAT and at an increasing rate.' The relevant coefficients
are -2.0, -3.5, -6.6.
The correlations among the unmeasured determinants (error terms)
of the three outcomes are shown at the bottom of Table 1. As expected,
the correlation between the unmeasured determinants of the application
and the college quality decisions is positive and large, .87. Thus,
given our set of measured characteristics, persons who are the most
likely to apply to some college are also likely to apply to a college
of higher quality than the average. Neither the correlation between the
error terms in the applications and admissions equations nor between the
unmeasured determinants of college quality and admission are significantly
different from zero by standard criteria. The first correlation is .08
and the second -.02.Because these are correlations between unmeasured
determinants of individual versus college decisions it is not surprising
that they are small. The two individual decisions are on the other hand
highly correlated.
1.If we let college SAT be represented by SAT and its mean by ji,
andits standard deviation by a, the specification is precisely described










- (p + a)if p +a<-24-
Most of the parameters are measured with considerable precision, as
judged by the standard errors. In the simulations below, however, we
have in one or two instances given results based on the estimated parameter
even though the parameter estimate was of marginal significance (saywith
a t-statistic considerably less than 2).
Finally, the numbers at the end of the table indicate that 40 percent
of the sample applied to a four-year college and that of those who
applied, 89 percent were admitted to the college listed as the first
choice. In short, there appears to be a substantial amount of self-
selection; most persons apply to schools where they are likely to be
admitted. And indeed, a surprisingly small number of schools are even
moderately selective.1 In any case, even these summary numbers suggest
that much of the effect of personal characteristics on college atten-
dance outcomes is through individual application and college qualitychoices
rather than through their effect on college admissionsdecisions.
B.The Effect of Two Standard Deviation Shifts and Category Changes
in Variables
To compare the estimated effects on the three outcomes of changes
in each of the right-hand variables, it is helpful to consider the
effectsof "comparable" changes in each of them. Such results are
presented in Table 2. An example will help to explain the entries in
this table. Consider the effect on the probability of application of
1.See Hartnett and Feidmesser [1980] where this finding isdis-
cussed in some detail, as well as findings on the proportionof appli-
cants admitted. The numbers that they cite are consistentwith our
findings.-25-
a change of 2 standard deviations in a person's SAT score, assuming that
none of the other variables is changed. We have assumed that each of the
other variables is equal to its sample mean. Then we have evaluated the
probability of application for a person with an SAT score one standard
deviation above the mean of students in our sample, and the probability
with an SAT score one standard deviation below the mean. The table entry
of .35 is the first probability minus the second. The entry of 120 in the
second column means that a person with an SAT score two standard deviations
(about 350 points) higher than the score of a second person with the same
(mean) values for other variables will on average apply to a school with
average SAT scores 120 points higher than the second person. The same
difference in SAT score would change the individual 's probability of admis-
sion by .12, other things equal. For non-continuous variables, the compar-
ison pertains to the change associated with the specified change in cate-
gory. For example, evaluating other variables at their means, the proba-
bility that children of parents who are both college graduates will apply
to some college is .29 higher than the probability for children of parents
with less than high school education. To evaluate the results in Table 2,
it is useful to keep in mind that the portion of the sample who applied
to a college was .40 and the overall admission rate was .89; the standard
deviation of college quality (SAT) is 124.
The estimates for admission are based only on the admission parameter
estimates. To obtain, for example, the probability that an individual X
will in fact be admitted to a school, we must consider the probability of
application and the expected quality of college applied to, as well as the
probability of admission. The results in Table 2 pertain to the effect on-26-
the probability of admission of a change in a qiven variable, shoulda
person with the mean X value for other variables be considered for appli-
cation.
The most important determinant of colleqe choice and admission is
scholastic preparation as reflected in the SAT score and high school
class rank measures; but other personal characteristics are also important.
Scholastic preparation and other variables are most important in deter-
mining whether or not to go to college at all and the quality of college
to apply to, rather than in the determination of admissions. We will
present below more evidence on this.
The influences of SAT score and class rank are of comparable orders
of magnitude in each of the equations, although the SAT score has a some-
what greater effect than class rank in both the application and college
quality equations.(The relevant magnitudes are shown in more detail
in the simulations below.)
The sinqie most important determinant of college admission, by these
measures, is the college quality itself. Colleges with better students
necessarily have more selective admissions policies on average. In the
terminology of the admissions model described on page 11, they require
higher academic potential. This is not apparently a student body size
effect, because student body size is not statistically significant when
added to the admissions equation)
1. Applicants to the better schools are more likely than applicants
to lower quality schools to make several applications to schools of com-
parable quality. Thus for this reason also, the probability of admis-
sion to any particular school should be expected to decline onaverage
with increasing school quality.-27-
Student government leadership in high school and athletic achieve-
ment are also positively related to the probability of college appli-
cation and to the quality of school to which persons apply. These measures
have estimated effects on the probability of application about one-half as
large as the estimated effect of a two-standard deviation (50 percentile
point) change in class rank. Their effect on college quality is also about
one-half as large as a two-standard deviation shift in class rank. Both of
these non—academic measures of achievement appear to be less important,
relative to other variables, in college admissions decisions than in student
college application and college quality decisions.
Parents' education, by these measures, has effects on college applica-
tion and college quality that in order of magnitude are more or less compa-
rable to the effects of class rank. The effect of a two-standard deviation
shift in parents' income is only about one-half as large as the effect of
the described change in parents' education. The effect of the change in
parents' income is about the same as the effect of the high school student
leader and athlete effects.
Black high school graduates with given characteristics are considerably
more likely to apply to four-year colleges than white high school graduates
with the same characteristics.' Their probability of application to a four-
year school is about .45 (absolute value) higher in both the North and the
South than the probability for whites in the North. Blacks may in general
be more likely to apply to college than whites of comparable ability and
background because of relatively greater returns to college education. The
1.Comparable results on post-secondary school attendance are
presented in Meyer and Wise [1979].-28-
result may also be a reflection in part of increased awareness of and
encouragement associated with government affirmative action policies. It
may also be that black colleges in the South attract some black students
who would not attend college if they lived in other regions of the country
and would go to non-black schools if they were to go to college. In other
reciions, particularly in the West, blacks may be more likely also to go
to junior colleges.
This latter observation is consistent with the observation that black
students in the South on average apply to considerably lower quality schools
than white students in the South, the difference in average college SAT is
81 points (the standard deviation of average college SAT is 124). On the
other hand, blacks in the non-South apply on average to schools with
average SAT scores about 58 points higher than the school applied to by
whites. Our estimates indicate that black students in both the North and
the South are apparently a bit more likely to be admitted than white
students, holding other variables constant, but in neither region is the
estimated effect significantly different from zero by standard criteria.
In general, if affirmative action has affected student college outcomes,
its effect has apparently been reflected more in student decisions than
in decisions of colleges.
Finally, we see that local labor market conditions have only small
estimated effects on college attendance and only the wage effect is signi-
ficant and of the expected sign; where the wage rate is high, persons are
less likely to go to college. The importance of these variables is
swamped by the influence of measures of academic ability and preparation
and by the effects of family background. Of course academic ability should-29-
Table 1.Parameter Estimates (and Asymptotic









SAT Score (÷1000) 2.423 0.303 1.471
(0.150) (0.018) (0.636)
High School Class Rank 1.431 0.147 1.155
(÷100) (0.100) (0.013) (0.269)
High School Student Leader 0.337 0.028 0.241
(0.077) (0.009) (0.173)
High School Athlete 0.333 0.038 0.182
(0.066) (0.008) (0.130)
Proportion of High School 0.811 0.105 -0.385
Class Going to College (0.120) (0.015) (0.315)
College SAT, 1 (÷1000) -1.968
(2.006)
College SAT, 2 (÷1000) -3.525
(1.957)
College SAT, 3 (÷1000) -6.632
(1.871)
Parents' Income (-l0,000) 0.266 0.023
(0.047) (0.006)
Education of Mother Less -0.041 -0.009
Than High School (0.054) (0.007)
Education of Mother College 0.226 0.010
Degree or More (0.070) (0.008)
Education of Father Less -0.248 -0.027
Than High School (0.053) (0.007)
Educationof Father College 0.238 0.031
Degree or More (0.061) (0.007)-30-
Table 1. Parameter Estimates (and Asymptotic Standard
Errors), by Equation (continued).
Variable Probability College aProbability
of Application Quality (SAT) of Admission
Black in the South
White in the South






























LoO Likelihood Value -1095.9
College Quality 2 0.016







a. College SAT divided by 1000.-31-
Table 2.Effects of Standard Deviation and Category












SAT Score 1 S.D. Above .35 120 .12
the Mean Versus 1 S.D.
Below the Mean
High School Class Rank, .29 81 .13
1 S.D. Above the Mean,
Versus 1 S.D. Below the
Mean
High School Student .13 28 .04
Leader Versus Not
High School Athlete .13 41 .02
Versus Not
Percent of High School .12 40 -.03
Class Going to College,
1 S.D. Above the Mean
Versus 1 S.D. Below
the Mean
College SAT, 1 SD. -.15
Above the Mean Versus
1 S.D. Below the Mean
Parentst Income, 1 S.D. .14 32
Above the Mean Versus 1
S.D. Below the Mean
Education of Mother and .29 78
Father College Degree
or More Versus Educa-
tion of Mother and
Father less than High
School-32-
Table2. Effects of Standard Deviation and Category Changes












Black in the South .46 -106 .01
Versus White in the
Non-South
Whitein the South .01 -25 - .01
Versus White inthe
Non-South
Blackin the Non-South .45 58 .03
VersusWhite in the
Non-South
Local Wage, 1 S.D. Above -.03
the Mean Versus 1 S.D.
Below the Mean
Local Unemployment Rate, -.02
1 S.D. Above the Mean
Versus 1 S.D. Below the
Mean
Male Versus Female .06 21 .02-33-
reflect in part the gains to be had from college education and this surely
reflects in part the reward to college training in the labor market.
C. Additional Simulations
To give a better idea of the relative effects of class rank and SAT
scores and their importance in application versus admissions decisions,
we have presented a few simulations. Suppose that other variables assume
sample mean values, while student SAT and class rank assume the various
values shown in Table 3. The table entries represent simulated estimates
of application and admission probabilities together with preferred college
qualities.
Notice first that estimated admission probabilities are much higher
than estimated application probabilities.In particular, persons in the
bottom half of their high school classes and with low SAT scores, say
700 or lower, are very unlikely to apply to a four-year college--.03
to .23. Yet if such persons applied to a college of average quality,
their likelihood of admission would be very high--between .52 and .82.
Even persons with high class rank and SAT scores are considerably less
likely to apply to colleges than to be admitted should they apply to
the average school. It seems apparent that the greatest impact of SAT
scores and class rank is on individual application decisions. The
relative impact on college admission is much less.
The effect of SAT scores and class rank on preferred college
quality is shown in the bottom part of Table 3. Again, we see sub-
stantial differences in average preferred college quality, depending on
individual academic performance and aptitude.- 34...
In short;, students seem to categorize themselves by SAT scores much
more than colleges themselves do.
Ihis is not to say that anyone has a relatively high probability of
being admitted to any school. To demonstrate this we havecalculated
admission probabilities at different quality colleges for selected SAT
and class rank values. The results are presented in Table 4.
At the lower quality colleges (800 is well below the average) the
probability of acceptance is high for all applicants. Thisis consistent
with the findings of Wing and Wallach [1971]. According to their findings
almost half of all schools essentially have open admission and don't
actively consider SAT scores, although they may require applicantsto take
the SAT.
On the other hand, it is clear that the probability of admission at
the best schools would be low for most students and would bewell below
a sure thing even for students with the bestacademic credentials. [Recall
that these simulation results assumed that individual attributes,other
than SAT score and class rank, are equal to the average over all persons
in the sample]. Our results should give a good indication of the expected
experience of students at the majority of schools. Forschools in the
tail of the selectivity distribution, however, our results may beless
accurate. For example, at schools with an average SAT of 1400, our prior
judgment was that almost no very poor student wouldbe admitted but our
simulations suggest probabilities greater than zero, and thesimulated
probabilities for the best students may be high. Of coursethe simulations
in the tails are based on extrapolations well beyond thecentral tendency
of the data, especially when it is assumed that other determinantsof-35-
Table 3.Simulated Application Probabilities, Admission
Probabilities and College Qualities, for
Selected SAT and Class Rank Values.
SAT
CLASS RANK (Percentile)
0 25 50 75 100
Probability of Application
500 .03 .06 .11 .19 .30
700 .07 .14 .23 .35 .49
900 .17 .27 .40 .54 .68
1100 .31 .45 .59 .72 .83
1300 .50 .64 .76 .86 .92
Probability of Admission at Average Quality College
500 .52 .63 .7 .82 .89
700 .64 .74 .82 .89 .93
900 .74 .82 .89 .93 .96
1100 .83 .89 .94 .96 .98
1300 .89 .94 .96 .98 .99
College Quality
500 690 727 764 800 837
700 751 788 824 861 898
'900 811 848 885 921 958
1100 872 909 945 982 1019
1300 932 969 1006 1042 1079-36-
Table 4. Simulated Probabilities of Admiion at Colleges





0 25 50 75 100
College SAT 800
500 .69 .78 .86 .91 195
700 .78 .86 .91 .95 .97
900 .86 .91 .95 .97 .98
1100 .92 .95 .97 .99 .99
1300 .95 .98 .99 .99 .99
College SAT 1100
500 .41 .53 .64 .74 .83
700 .53 .64 .74 .83 .89
900 .65 .75 .83 .89 .94
1100 .75 .83 .89 .94 .97
1300 .83 .89 .94 .97 .98
College SAT 1400
500 .02 .04 .07 .12 .18
700 .04 .07 .12 .19 .27
900 .07 .12 .19 .27 .38
1100 .12 .19 .28 .38 .49
1300 .20 .28 .38 .49 .61—37-
admissions are held constant. In addition, we have not allowed interaction
terms--say between SAT and class rank--that might be expected to improve
the "fit" of our specification, especially at extreme values of the explan-
atory variables, Nonetheless, a very small proportion (9 percent) of
schools admit fewer than half their applicants according to the findings
of other investigators.1
For purposes of comparison we have presented in Appendix Table 2
simple binary probit estimates of the admission equation together with
the estimates based on the three-equation model. Simulated admissions
probabilities based on the probit estimates are very close to those shown
in Table 4, although we have not shown them.2
To give an idea of the importance of socioeconomic background, as
compared to academic aptitude and performance, we have presented a few
simulations of application probabilities and school qualities based on
selected values of parents' income and education. They are shown in
Table 5. Again, the results are based on the assumption that other
variables are equal to their respective sample means.
Although both parents' income and education are substantially related
to the probability of application and to college quality, their effect on
student choices is clearly less than the effect of SAT scores. Surprisingly
to us, even persons from high income ($18,000 in 1972 dollars) families
1. See Hartnett and Feldmesser [1980].
2. This result of course is consistent with the very small correla-
tions between the disturbance term in the admission equation and the
disturbance terms in the college application and college quality equations.-38-
Table 5. Simulated Application Probabilities and
College Qualities for Selected Values of
























and with college-educated parents, with other characteristics equal to
the sample average, have only a .58 probability of applying to a four-
year college.
IV. Concluding Comments
While SAT scores certainly exclude some persons from some schools,
to us they seem not to represent a dominating constraint on the college
opportunities of high school graduates.
Although among the measures we have considered SAT scores are surely
an important determinant of college admissions decisions in the top 50
percent or so of colleges, and an important determinant of student college
application and college quality decisions, other personal attributes are
also important. In particular, high school class rank is of comparable
importance. In addition, the importance of SAT scores is much more
apparent in their influence on student application and college quality
decisions than in the admission decisions of colleges. Although persons
with low academic ability and past performance are very unlikely to apply
to any four-year college, such persons, if they were to apply to a college
of average quality say, would have a rather high probability of admission.
The probability of admission is much higher than the probability of
application.
1
This suggests strongly to us that low rates of application are not
1. These results pertain to the marginal student (or a small number
of students) should he choose to apply. If all students who don't now
apply, were to decide to apply, the result undoubtedly would no longer
hold. In this case, at least in the short run, supply constraints would
lower admission probabilities.—40-
simply the reflection of expectations of low admission probabilities.'
As casual observation suggests, person with low scholastic aptitude
and past school performance may be likely to find school unenjoyable and
to expect that they will not get much out of college education. Indeed,
for them a college education may not be a good human capital investment.
This is not to say that even the best students can gain admission to any
school of their choice; they of course cannot. Nonetheless, the pro-
bability of admission at even the more selective schools is apparently
higher than some of us might have expected.
To the extent that colleges use SAT scores, it is in the context
of all information available to admissions officers. The admissions
criteria that would pertain if SAT scores were not available is uncertain.
In particular, it is not clear that without the test scores persons who
would score low on them would have a greater chance of admission, even
at the more selective schools. Nor would it be demonstrably correct to
assume that without test scores more minority students, more students
from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds, or more individuals from any
other group would be admitted to colleges. It may well be, for example,
that tests "screen in" more students or encourage more students than they
1. This is not to say that there is no such effect. Indeed Feld-
messer and Hartnett in a personal communication to us have suggested that
there is at least strong anecdotal evidence that most people believe that
colleges and universities are more selective than in fact they are. On
the other hand, of persons in the National Longitudinal Study who were
working full-time in October 1972, only 17 percent said they were not con-
tinuing education full-time because of poor grades or test scores, while
31 percent said they needed more money to continue schooling, 41 percent
that their future plans didn't require schooling, and 38 percent that they
wanted to take a break. Persons could have responded affirmatively to
more than one possibility.-41-
screen out. Although some students may not apply because they think their
scores are too low, others may apply because they discover themselves to
be "smarter than they thought."
To the extent that SAT scores do determine student application and
college admissions decisions, there are at least two related questions
that are the subject of current and future research on our part.
If students self-select themselves to colleges (or not) in part
on the basis of SAT scores, and if colleges admit students in part on
the basis of these scores, we would like to know if indeed these decisions
seem to be in accord with individual experiences in colleges, should they
attend. One indication of this would be the relationship between achieve-
ment in college and dropout rates on the one hand and individual academic
ability and college quality on the other. We are focusing on this question
in related research.1 Note that it is important to consider college drop-
out decisions, not simply class rank or qrades of those who are in college
or obtain degrees. It may well be that expected student performance in
college accords well with observed student decisions. If this were true,
it would provide support for the information value to students of scholas-
tic ability measures.
To the extent that SAT scores prevent students from gaining entry to
the college of their choice, we would like to know what the effect of this
constraint is on opportunities following college graduation. One measure
of the effect of such a constraint on later opportunities is the relation-
1. See Venti and Wise, "Test Scores and Self-Selection of Higher
Education: College Attendance Versus College Completion," Mimeograph,
July 1980.-42-
ship between college quality--given pre-college characteristics including
test scores-—and earnings after college graduation. Although this is by
no means a new question, the final follow-up to the National Longitudinal
Study of the High School Class of 1972 will provide a unique opportunity
to address it.1 Both of these questions are related to the work on school
selection and earnings by Willis and Rosen [1979], although they have
approached their work from a somewhat different direction.
Finally, a continuing concern is the relationship between attributes
that determine success in college and those that determine job performance.
Although not the subject of this paper, it is interesting to note that
the kinds of attributes that are evidently important in the determination
of individual college application decisions, have also been found to be
related to the job success of college graduates, although their relative
importance in the two situations may differ (see Wise [1975a, 1975b]).
1. Evidence on related questions was presented in Wise [1975a and
1975b], Solmon [1975], Solmon and Wachtel [1975], and Morgan and Duncan
[1979].-43-
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Appendix Table 1. Variable Means and Standard
Deviations for Total Sample
and for College Applicants.
Variable
Total Sample ApplicantsOnly
Mean Standard Deviation Mean StandardDeviation
SAT Score 835 198 953 202
High School Class .550 .276 .691 .237
Rank
High School Student .072 .258 .122 .328
Leader
High School Athlete .103 .303 .149 .356
Percent of High School .506 .190 .549 .194
Class Going to College
College SAT -- -- 1024 124
Parents' Incomea 11185 5382 12772 5537
Education of Mother
less than High School .264 .441 .165 .371
Education of Mother .114 .318 .196 .397
College Degree or More
Education of Father .321 .467 .191 .393
less than High School
Education of Father .189 .392 .318 .466
College Degree or More
Black in the South .062 .240 .063 .244
(High School)
White in the South .213 .410 .200 .400
(High School)
Black in the Non-South .037 .189 .043 .204
(High School)-48-
Appendix Table 1.Variable Means and Standard
Deviations for Total Sample
and for College Applicants
(continued).
Variable
Total Sample Applicants Only
MeanStandard Deviation MeanStandard Deviation
Black in the South
(College)
—- -- .058 .234
White in the South
(College)
-- -- .209 .407
Black in the Non-
South (College)
-- -- .048 .215
Local Wage 3.930 .592 -— -—
Local Unemployment 3.897 1.862 -— --
Male .490 .499 .508 .500
Urban High School .251 .433 .262 .440
Total Sample 5001
Number of College Applicants 2005
Number Admitted 1799
a. Calculations exclude observations with missing values.-49-
Appendix Table 2. Admissions Model Parameter
Estimates (and Asymptotic







SAT Score (-1000) 1.518 1.471
(0.301) (0.636)
High School Class Rank 1.121 1.155
(+ 100) (0.212) (0.269)
High School Student 0.214 0.241
Leader (0.151) (0.173)
High School Athlete 0.194 0.182
(0.121) (0.130)
Proportion of High School -0.355 -0.385
Class Going to College (0.244) (0.315)
College SAT, 1 (÷1000) -2.931 -1.968
(0.769) (2.006)
College SAT, 2 (--1000) -4.186 -3.525
(1.221) (1.957)
College SAT, 3 (÷ 1000) -6.703 -6.632
(1.136) (1.871)
Black in the South -0.228 -0.055
(0.212) (0.336)
White in the South -0.070 -0.043
(0.111 (0.115)
Black in the Non-South 0.111 0.174
(0.187) (0.200)—50-
Appendix Table 2. Admissions Model Parameter
Estimates (and Asymptotic
Standard Errors) by Method
of Estimation (continued)
Variable
Method of Estimation
Probit
Joint Estimation
of 3 Equations
Male
Urban High School
Constant
-0.103
(0.093)
0.056
(0.096)
2.541
(0.773)
-0.095
(0.095)
0.049
(0.097)
1.513
(0.633)